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A Revolution That Has Not Happened:  
The Potential  
of the Russian Nationalist Revival
Introductory remarks
World history abounds with revolutionary political changes. 
What does not seem important about that topic is the theoretical 
framework, which allows many scholars to discuss whether 
a political series of events can be put into the conceptual, systemic 
framework of “revolution” or not. What is widely accepted among 
theoreticians is the conviction that a revolution is a radical and 
anti-systemic political change. The theoretical understanding of 
revolution is related to the legitimacy of authority. The Weberian 
tradition includes 3 types of authority: traditional, legal-rational, and 
charismatic (comp. the critical remarks of Blau, 1963). According 
to it, a revolution can either violently break the people’s readiness to 
obey commands of a culturally rooted power or overthrow the old 
regime by acting according to a new system of laws, which replaces 
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the previous one without a sense of remorse. The new leaders and 
their style can often be defined as charismatic but theoretically we 
can easily think of a new, even more charismatic avant-garde, which 
steals the show: in revolutions a more radical kind of modernity 
usually replaces the previous style, which is perceived to be not 
revolutionary enough. In other words, revolutions undermine the 
base of all the three types of authority.
However, what really matters is the fact that after a revolution 
one’s smaller or bigger world will never be the same. Revolutions are 
incongruent with Tancredi’s (a character of Lampedusa’s Leopard) 
conviction that “For everything to stay the same, everything must 
change”. After a revolution not too many things stay the same: the 
main imperatives are either denied or even reversed – what was 
a vice in the old times becomes a virtue nowadays.
From the empirical or historical perspective, one can observe 
several types of revolutions. A classical study on the topic, Tanter 
& Midlarsky (1967, p. 265), lists four types: a mass revolution, 
a revolutionary coup, a reform coup and a palace revolution. 
This point of view, however, focuses on the technical aspect of 
change, whereas in the present study it is much more important 
to emphasize the object of contestation on the one hand, and the 
general objective, the imaginary future on the other. From the 
perspective of the first aspect, a lot of types can be distinguished 
but most of them boil down to three categories. 
1. Some revolutions are generally directed against a monarchy or 
another kind of autocratic power. Most European revolutions, 
including the Puritan Revolution in England, the French 
Revolution and the February Revolution in Russia led to 
toppling the contested monarchy. The imperatives that lead the 
revolutionaries to the barricades consist mainly in such things 
as the elevation of the people or administrative liberalization.
2. When the “people’s regime” turns out to be more invasive than 
the old system, especially if the leftist rules are imposed from 
69A Revolution That Has Not Happened: The Potential…
outside, an anti-socialist or an anti-communist revolution may 
demolish the radically egalitarian authorities. This is the case 
of the Thermidorian Reaction or the Autumn of Nations in 
Eastern Europe.
3. Another type of revolution is directed against the state that 
does not allow a people to develop its nationalistic desires: the 
will to unite, the desire for the fulfillment of pride, the libido 
dominandi among other nations or, finally, the desire to keep 
one’s own uniqueness, which is expressed in Russian with the 
term of samobytnost’ (самобытность). Historically, national 
revolutions and uprisings have taken various shapes such as 
the activities of the Spanish Falanga, which successfully fought 
the internationalist Republic, the Nazi upheaval in the 1930s or 
the Kurdish revival in Iraq in the 2010s. The theoretical aspect 
of the topic may not have been studied sufficiently; however, 
some publications concerning the issue are recommended 
(Unwalla, 2015; Kumar, 2015).
Russia can be described as a post-revolutionary country in 
at least two aspects. It underwent a deep deconstruction of its 
original civilizational structure after 1917 and, after more than 
70 years of the communist experiment, it had to face the collapse 
of the “red empire” and try to build a democratic civil society and 
free market. As in the case of gnostic utopia and in international 
relations both at home and abroad, we have to deal with two 
acts of deconstruction, where old values and dichotomies were 
replaced by new ones. Old Russia was predominantly an Orthodox 
and East-Slavic, ethnically Russian (russkaya) domain. The most 
typical oppositions in the political discourse oscillated around 
two topics:
1. “Russian” versus “Western”, where for the Westerners Russia 
should approach the European standards or, according to the 
Slavophil thinkers, it should protect its uniqueness and avoid 
the poison of the Western spirit.
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2. “Orthodox” versus “atheist or heretic”. For traditionalists and 
the vast majority of the Russian population participation in the 
Eastern Church was a sine qua non condition of being a “real 
Russian”.
What seems surprising, in spite of the fact that the social 
question – the situation of the people – was widely discussed by 
the intelligentsia and a kind of “state populism” was also present, 
it would not be relevant to say that the intellectual elite tried to 
set one of the social classes against the other. Contrary to the 
Marxist belief in class struggle, the Russian intelligentsia tried to 
be sympathetic toward the peasants and took many actions which 
varied from charity to political terror against the state officials 
(comp. Nahirny, 1983).
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 changed a lot in the narrative. 
In fact it became entirely deconstructed. The opposition between 
the West and traditional Russia disappeared to be replaced by 
another juxtaposition: nationalism (or Great Russian chauvinism 
even) versus socialist internationalism. Only political tactics made 
Vladimir I. Lenin support the national independence ambitions. 
According to the Bolshevik leader, severe steps against nationalisms 
would provoke the nations to abandon the only sensible objective 
which is the liberalization of the world proletariat. The nations, 
focusing on the national conflicts, could thus be successfully tempted 
by the exploiters to forget about the main task (Lenin, 1972; see 
also the study on the controversy about the issue in Löwy, 1976).
The clue to the problem lies in the fact that before 1917 
the  value  of  national  patriotism  among  the  opposition  was 
a positive option, and Western cosmopolitism was perceived as 
a problematic attitude (in most of the Russian press and in the 
educational narrative; for the leftist intelligentsia the destruction 
of the old regime and the old cultural paradigm was the main 
objective), whereas now resorting to Russian national sentiments 
was proclaimed reactionary and became the negative pole of the 
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new opposition. As mentioned above, Russian traditionalists 
glorified the Russian people, especially the peasantry, no less than 
the leftists did. The goal was different, of course, because the leftists 
aimed at the liberalization of the “dark mass” and the monarchists, 
Slavophiles or Pan-Slavists preached about the people as the solid 
foundation of tsarism and Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the people 
and the elite (both reactionary and revolutionary) could agree on 
a certain kind of solidarity.
The revolution brought about a significant change, which, on 
a side note, was predicted by the Populist (Narodnik) and Bolshevik 
narratives, where the category of “the enemy of the people” played 
an important part. Previously, everybody praised the people, 
now the population was categorized into two different groups: 
the proletariat, the avant-garde of the proletariat (the Bolshevik 
Party), and, finally, the group of the enemies of the people. The 
term became very broad due to the fact that the Bolsheviks (or 
radical revolutionaries in general) did not enjoy general support. 
In the election to the Constituent Assembly in late fall of 1917 
the socialist agrarian democrats – the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party with Victor Chernov at the helm won most of the votes in 
the house, whereas the Bolsheviks with the Left SRs did not even 
exceed a quarter of the general vote (comp. Radkey, 1950). 
The other reason for the expansion of the category was the 
intention to wipe out not only the reactionary camp but also 
the left side of the political stage in all cases of real or imaginary 
disobedience.  The  Bolsheviks  accused  the  other  Russian 
revolutionaries, the Mensheviks or the Left SRs, of not being 
revolutionary enough and leading the people astray. The Bolshevik 
radicalism in the struggle for the ultimate dictatorship of the 
proletariat turned all the other leftists into the category of the enemy 
of the people. Moreover, under the Stalin regime many devoted 
Bolshevik activists were executed as a result of the same kind of 
accusations (see Stalin’s pamphlet: Mastering Bolshevism).
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After more than seven decades, the great change of the 1990s 
brought about another kind of deconstruction. In fact it fits quite 
well in Tanter & Midlarsky’s category of a “reform coup”. After 
December 1991, the Russian people woke up in a different reality: 
not only had the peaceful revolution destroyed their big state but 
it also undermined the paradigm of social and moral values. The 
new times created new oppositions such as
– “democracy” versus “communist authoritarianism”, 
– “liberalism” versus “Soviet totalitarianism”,
– “the self-made person” versus a collectivist “Homo 
Sovieticus” (sovok).
The axiological values of the poles were reversed: communism 
was now associated with the lack of personal freedom, the Soviet 
state was accused of crimes and, consequently, being a Homo 
Sovieticus became an insult (see the study on the sovok syndrome 
in Gogin, 2012). The older generation, which was deeply permeated 
with the idea of economic equality and social security could not 
understand foreign ideas and imperatives, which forced them to 
accept aggressive business games, spectacular careers of cunning 
swindlers,  and  painful  pauperization  of  the  majority  of  the 
citizens. 
Seeking elements that were commonly present or absent in the 
axiological oppositions of the three periods mentioned above, one 
can realize that Post-Communist Russia was unexpectedly quite 
liberal in the economic sense. Individual freedom and private 
initiative turned out to be capable of subordinating the other 
needs and values. The common good, especially in the sense of 
the social security of the average citizen, was entirely forgotten. In 
the same way one of the most important triggers for ideologists 
was lost: the “just cause” or sacrifice in the name of the people. The 
tsarist doctrine, created in the 1830s by the Minister of National 
Education, count Sergei Uvarov, promoted the ideas of Orthodoxy 
(pravoslavie),  Autocracy  (samoderzhavie),  and,  surprisingly 
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enough – narodnost’, which can be translated as Nationhood or 
Peoplehood (Uvarov, 1832). On the other hand, the revolutionary 
and moderate intelligentsia was ready for jail or hard work in 
Siberia if their struggle for the happiness of the people demanded 
such dramatic decisions.
Nothing like that characterizes the latest period of Russian 
history. Even though the new elite that came to power with 
Vladimir Putin after the beginning of the new millennium became 
much more assertive and rejected the previous subordination 
to Western interests and naive liberalism, it only replaced the 
previous oligarchy and still avoided any commitments concerning 
the common good of the citizens. In this way the axiological 
base of Post-Soviet Russia owes a lot to radical revolutionary 
deconstruction: it moved away from obligations concerning the 
people. The new times appeared to be painfully real, they brought 
about a completely new reality, an odd kind of business-like social 
contract (Gallopin, 2009). 
A historical study concerning any country or civilization 
ought to be based on facts and keep clear of “the alternative past”. 
In other words, historians describe facts and search for reasons. 
Political science, however, is not obliged to keep these standards 
since it is supposed to deal with current events and be confined 
to prognostic tasks. That is why it has to take into consideration 
probability and potentials in the same way as facts. Historians 
(despite being aware of their tasks) may not realize that their 
vision of the course of events is slightly deterministic whereas 
in fact none of the recorded and described historical events was 
entirely predictable a priori.
Sudden revolutions as well as longitudinal periods of duration 
are embedded in a complex structure of conditions, possibilities 
and decisions. Decisions made either by the leaders or by the people 
can be studied a posteriori but cannot be predicted with absolute 
certainty. However, the probability of events may be considered 
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while studying the well-known elements of the decision-making 
process and even ought to be taken into account in a prognostic 
study (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975). Theoretically, our 
point of interest lies in possible revolutions or other series of 
events which could have happened, may happen or should happen 
because of some reasons.
The range of perceived probability can vary from “absolute 
impossibility” to the strong feeling that “something is in the air” and 
that we are supposed to experience political turbulence tomorrow. 
What has to be remembered is the fact that we are still dealing 
with perceived probability since probability in the mathematical or 
physical sense (in quantum mechanics) cannot be applied directly 
in political science analyses even if they are based on quantitative 
(e.g. statistical) research. This does not mean that hard data that 
are helpful in the explanation of some events such as the number 
of guns or aircrafts should not be valued. The problem probably 
lies in the infinite number of conditioning factors.
The present chapter is devoted to an “imaginary revolution”, 
a vital problem in the Russian political reality, which has manifested 
itself several times but never resulted in a mass uprising or in 
a reform coup. The topic is somewhat inspired by the considerations 
of Tat’yana and Valeri Solovei, whose brilliant and pessimistic 
study Несостоявшаяся революция (The Unfulfilled Revolution) 
published in 2011 paints a picture of the tragedy of the Russian 
nation within its own state and the story of a necessary change 
that could never be realized because of internal contradictions 
within the nationalistic camp.
 The question of a nationalist revolution in Russia has been 
widely discussed not only by intellectuals but also among Russian 
politicians and in the media. In 2005 Andrei Savelyev, a prominent 
politician and member of the Rodina faction, openly declared in 
his lecture presented at the St. Petersburg Patriotic Forum that his 
party was not preparing a revolution but was getting ready for it 
(Савельев, 2005). 
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The hypothetical revolutionary option is treated by some circles 
as necessary because of the impossibility to realize the Russian 
national idea in a legal way. One of the very few nationalistic 
parties in Russia which work legally and enjoy their participation 
in the establishment is the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR) with Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky (Eidelstein) at 
the helm. However, his program and everyday narrative can be 
explained as a certain kind of “franchised nationalism” since 
Zhirinovsky managed to register his party in the Communist 
era as the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union; before 
that he co-headed the cultural organization Shalom, which was 
created to channel Jewish sentiments in the situation of increasing 
anti-Communist attitudes among that minority, which in turn led 
to mass migration, predominantly to Israel.
Another case of a legal nationalist-conservative political 
being is the Rodina (Homeland) Party, created in 2003 by Dmitry 
Rogozin. The party disappeared in 2006 because of a merge 
with Just Russia but was re-established in 2011 as an outcome of 
a conference of another nationalist organization: the Congress 
of Russian Communities. It was initially founded (in 1990) to 
promote the interests of ethnic Russians who were left beyond 
the Russian border as a result of the collapse of the USSR. The 
organization was officially registered in 2011. 
The other nationalistic groups, however, were much less 
successful. The list below illustrates only some representative 
cases.
1. A relatively early creation – the National-Republican Party of 
Russia, founded in 1991 by Nikolai Lysenko, was not persecuted 
as a whole but its leader was charged with the organization of 
a terrorist attack in the State Duma. Although the accusation 
was finally rejected, Lysenko was found guilty of stealing a state 
computer. In 1996, after the arrest of Lysenko, the party split 
into two factions. The faction which was led by Yuri Belyaev was 
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later transformed into The Party of Liberty (Партия свободы). 
Since the National-Republican Party of Russia could not be re-
registered until the end of 1998, it practically ceased to exist.
2. The Russian National Unity (Русское Национальное 
Единство) movement, a relatively big radical and militaristic 
group, established in 1990 by Alexandr Barkashov, was banned 
after supporting the Parliament in 1993 and has since been 
functioning in this manner. The organization tried to take 
part in the elections of 1999 within the Spas bloc but the 
Moscow court did not recognize its registration. From that 
point onwards it has been functioning in a semi-legal capacity. 
In some interpretations the RNU, the Slavic Union and other 
organizations of that kind should be described as post-fascist 
(or post-Nazi even) rather than nationalistic in the classical 
western tradition of the term (comp. Hearst, 1999).
3. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers (Союз православных 
хоругвеносцев), which, in fact, is not a political party but an 
organization founded in 1992 with the goal of re-establishing 
absolute Christian monarchy, was not banned but had to face 
several court cases. Its slogan, “Orthodoxy or Death”, was 
removed from a church building near St. Petersburg as a result 
of the prosecutor’s inquiry.
4. The People’s National Party (Народная национальная 
партия), registered originally in 1994 as the Movement of the 
People’s Nationalists (Движение народных националистов), 
proposed a racist program in which the bloodline conditions 
the predominance of the Russian nation in the state. The 
political line of the leader, Alexandr Ivanov-Sukharevsky, as 
well as that of some other activists, led to the decision about 
the refusal to re-register the party in 1998. 
5. An anti-immigrant nationalistic group – the Movement Against 
Illegal Immigration, which appeared in 2002 after an ethnic 
fight between Russians and Armenians in Krasnoarmeysk, 
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was officially banned by the court in 2011. The movement 
was originally led by Vladimir Basmanov, then by his brother, 
Alexandr Belov (Potkin), and, since 2011, by Vladimir 
Yermolaev. In October 2016 the movement’s most influential 
leader – Alexandr Belov was sentenced to 7.5-year imprisonment 
in a collective labor colony.
6. The Slavic Union (Славянский союз), organized by Dmitry 
Demushkin in 2000 concentrated on the idea of an ethnically 
Russian nation-state. Clear links to some Nazi symbols (the 
acronym of the organization’s name – SS or a kind of swastika) 
and Holocaust denial made the ban on the organization 
inevitable: the decision was made by the court in April 2010. 
After that Demushkin (accompanied by some other activists 
e.g. Belov-Potkin) decided to take part in the creation of a new 
organization – The Russians (Русские). However, this one was 
banned as well in October 2015. Demushkin was put under the 
travel ban whereas Vladimir Basmanov was forced to go abroad 
where he created a new nationalistic group: the Committee 
“Nation and Liberty” (Комитет «Нация и Свобода»).
7. The national-traditionalist Great Russia Party (Великая 
Россия), founded by Dmitry Rogozin and Andrei Savelyev in 
2007 was refused registration twice, which led to a temporary 
break in its functioning. However, in 2010 another attempt to 
re-establish the party was made.
8. The National-Democratic Party (Национально-Демократи-
ческая Партия), which was created by Konstantin Krylov 
in 2012 on the base of two organizations: the Russian Social 
Movement (Русское Общественное Движение) and the 
Russian Civic Union (Русский Гражданский Союз), was 
officially registered in 2014 but later the registration information 
was refuted. Krylov himself was put on trial under Article 282 of 
the infamous bill of 2002 in connection with his public speech 
at the rally – “Stop feeding the Caucasus”, held on October 22, 
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2011 at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, and sentenced to 120 
hours of correctional labor, which made him legally unable to 
become the official leader of any party (Tipaldou 2015, p. 70).
This short overview suffices to reveal the range of Russo-
centric nationalist sentiments in the Russian Federation. The 
main question, however, is about the reasons for the appearance 
of Russian nationalism nowadays in the country where the most 
important positions belong to ethnic Russians and where the 
widely promoted Russian language and culture are supposed to 
shape the behavioral patterns of the population. Two options seem 
the most obvious at first sight: the historical grounds – the soil for 
a possible nationalist change, or the current situation, which may 
have led the Russian nation to take such steps.
The traditions of Russian nationalism
From a theoretical point of view, we must be aware that there 
are various kinds of nationalism, and that Russia is by no means 
an exception: the term of nationalism can be applied there to 
phenomena which are conceptually far from each other. We may 
consider various typologies. For example, Hechter (2000) suggests 
such kinds of nationalism as:
– state-building nationalism, whose essence lies in creating 
a more homogenous society,
– peripheral nationalism, found in communities which try 
to avoid acculturation,
– irredentist nationalism, with a tendency to enlarge the 
state’s territory,
– unification nationalism, which “involves the merger of 
a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory 
into one state” (Hechter, 2000, pp. 15–17).
In fact we could also distinguish some other forms, such as the 
ethnic, cultural, political, nativistic or vitalistic kind of nationalism 
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(Bäcker, 2008, pp. 11ff). The general question probably lies in 
the definition of la nation, which generally boils down to three 
essentially different bases: the ethnic (or racial) root, culture and 
statehood. However, it seems that it is the empirical material that 
delivers some more convincing hints for structuring the tradition 
of nationalism in Russia. 
At any rate, in order to attempt to clarify the structure of 
conditioning circumstances one has to look back to the traditions 
of Russian nationalism according to the shape they have taken in 
Russian historiography and in the classical works describing the 
history of Russian political thought. Nationalism in Russia is by 
no means an invention of the end of the 20th century. It generated 
several earlier incarnations. Here are the most representative 
ones:
1. Slavophilism (slavyanofil’stvo, славянофильство), which was 
originally constructed by a very small group of columnists such 
as Ivan Kireevsky, Konstantin Aksakov, Alexei Khomyakov or 
Yuri Samarin. The movement’s thinkers preached about the 
superiority of Orthodoxy – the only true religion, the historical 
tradition of Old Rus’ and the Eastern conciliarism over the 
Western legacy: the intellectualism of Western Christianity, 
the tradition of competition, social contract and papalism. 
The Slavophiles, who strongly criticized the Petrine reforms, 
were not the beloved child of the court, which made itself out 
to be a reliable and modern European monarchy rather than 
a museum of medieval folk culture (comp. Walicki, 1975).
2. Pochvennichestvo (почвенничество), which was a philosophy 
of  the  return  to  the  roots,  a  trend  that  appeared  among 
traditionalist  publishers,  critics  and  writers  such  as  Apollon 
Grigoryev,  Nikolai  Strakhov  or  Fyodor  Dostoevsky.  The 
pochvenniks  did  not  reject  modernization  but  emphasized 
the necessity to cultivate Russian convictions, especially the 
ones that referred to Orthodox practices and national axiology 
(comp. Walicki, 1975).
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3. Russian Pan-Slavism – the idea of uniting all Slavs. The trend 
began  in  the  Austrian  Empire  but  was soon  taken  over 
by  Russian  ideologists  such  as  Mikhail  Pogodin,  Nikolai  Y. 
Danilevsky,  Ivan  Aksakov,  Vladimir  Cherkassky,  Rostislav 
Fadeev. The main ideological base for the doctrine was 
formulated by Danilevsky in his famous book Russia and 
Europe (Eng. trans. 2013), where he introduced the idea of 
a Slavic Union with the capital in Constantinople, which was 
supposed to be regained from the Turks (comp. MacMaster, 
1967; Snyder, 1984, pp. 17–36).
4. The Black Hundred (Чёрная сотня) ideologies, which were 
represented by several organizations such as the Union of the 
Russian People (Союз русского народа), Russian Monarchist 
Party (Русская монархическая партия), White Two-Headed 
Eagle (Белый двуглавый орёл) or St. Michael’s Union (Русский 
Народныи Союз имени Святого Михаила Архангела), 
established by the famous and controversial activist Vladimir 
Purishkevich. Their programs, which were in fact a reaction 
to socialist and liberal movements, included such elements as 
devotion to the throne and Orthodox religion, anti-socialism, 
anti-Westernism, various forms of anti-Semitism including 
anti-assimilationism, and the conviction that building a nation 
state is a necessity (comp. Laqueur, 1993).
What may be surprising nowadays is the fact that modern 
Russian nationalism, although it is equally suppressed and 
marginalized as it was under the tsarist regime, does not descend 
from the old doctrines apart from the most basic idea that 
constitutes any nationalism – the elevation of the nation. The only 
visible convergence can be observed between modern Russian 
nationalism and the Black Hundreds. How can that be explained? 
Paradoxically, this historical reflection takes us to another line of 
explanation: to facts and numbers.
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The ethnic and social reality after the Russian  
Revolution
What made the situation after 1905 in Russia under the old 
regime different from the last decades of the former century was 
the fact that the traditionalistic and nationalist circles realized 
that at that time not only a narrow elite but also a significant 
part of the working class, including the peasantry, which made 
up no less than 85% of the whole population, felt disappointed 
with the regime and was ready to promote significant reforms. 
The contestation of the emperor’s court as well as of the church, 
which provided strong ideological support to the throne, made 
the Russian rightists aware that the spirit began to shift to the left. 
But was it simply a turn in the Russian soul?
The Russian Empire had never been a national state. As already 
mentioned, it was only ideologically integrated by the values of 
Orthodoxy, Authority and Peoplehood. The monarchs had no 
Russian blood in their veins, and many high-ranking officials 
were either foreigners or people of non-Russian descent. However, 
the 19th century brought about extraordinary interest in foreign 
social and political ideas. Moreover, some important political 
movements were created with significant presence of Jewish, 
Polish and other activists who represented various nations, which 
were by no means interested in the stability of the empire. 
The importance of that issue can be illustrated by pure facts. 
The non-Marxist revolutionary Populist (Narodnik) organizations, 
which caused the original political unrest, owed a lot to people 
of foreign descent. Among the very few founders of the Black 
Repartition (Чeрный передел) there are such figures as Paul 
Axelrod and Leo Deutsch, who were born into Jewish families. In 
the more radical and terrorist faction Narodnaya Volya (People’s 
Will) one should not forget the names of Yakov Yudelevsky, 
a Belarusian Jew and a significant French philosopher, as well as 
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the figure of the Polish nobleman Ignacy Hryniewiecki, the killer 
of tsar Alexander II. One of the most prominent theoreticians 
of Russian socialism was Vasily (Vilgelm) Bervi-Flerovsky, son 
of William Bervy, an official of the Ministry of Justice of purely 
English descent. The theoreticians of legal Marxism: Nikolai 
Sieber and Petr Struve had well-known German ancestors; Struve 
was a grandson of a famous astronomer, Friedrich Georg Wilhelm 
von Struve. The Menshevik leaders were predominantly Jewish 
with Yulius Martov (Tsederbaum) at the helm. Vladimir I. Lenin, 
the leader of the Bolshevik faction, had Russian but also many 
other roots. His father was of Russian, Chuvash and Mordvin 
(or Kalmyk) descent whereas his mother had Swedish, German, 
Russian as well as Jewish ancestors. A brief look at the other 
prominent leaders of the party explains a lot: Leo Trotsky (Leiba 
Bronstein), Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld), Grigory Zinoviev (Hirsch 
Apfelbaum) and Lazar Kaganovich were unquestionably Jewish, 
Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Lavrentiy 
Beria were Georgian, Anastas Mikoyan – Armenian; the founder 
of Cheka – Feliks Dzerzhinsky (Feliks Dzierżyński) – a Polish 
nobleman, whereas the most radical activist of that institution and 
the head of the Red Army Cheka, Martin Lacis (Jānis Sudrabs) – 
a Latvian farmworker.
The feeling that citizens of foreign descent (rus. inorodcy, 
инородцы) were predominantly responsible for the destruction 
of the empire was strengthened by the ethnic structure of Russia, 
which evolved throughout the passing decades. Before the 
partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795) the Russian territory 
was settled mainly by Eastern Slavs. The tiny minorities, such as 
the Finno-Ugric peoples or Tartars did not play a big part in the 
country’s policies. However, after the annexation of a significant 
part of Poland and the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire 
began to grow again and absorbed numerous and “problematic” 
nations. The much better educated and technologically advanced 
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Poles gradually became more and more hostile toward the regime 
and to Russia in general. At the end of the 19th century the Jewish 
population, which became a “blessing” after the incorporation 
of Poland’s eastern territories, began to take active part in the 
revolutionary movement since its position in the empire was 
quite far from modern standards of civic equality. What seemed 
especially annoying to some Jews was the Pale of Settlement 
(cherta osedlosti, черта оседлости) proclaimed in a decree issued 
by Catherine the Great in 1791. According to the decree, which 
was later annexed by the bill of 1804, Jews could only settle in 
the Western territories of the empire in sixteen governorates. The 
other problem was the lack of political rights until the last days 
of the tsarist state. It was apparent that Russian Jews hoped for 
suffrage in the new form of the country; in a way their hopes came 
true after 1917. 
In the second half of the 19th century the country experienced 
another inflow of ethnically non-Russian citizens (or, to be 
precise, subjects to the emperor) – the Muslim peoples of Central 
Asia, which at that time was usually named Turkestan. Russia’s 
expansion to the South was unwillingly directed to the Islamic and 
Turkic world. Initially, the people of Turkestan – Kazakhs, Uzbeks, 
the Kyrgyz people, Iranian Tajiks – did not seem a real challenge. 
Their demographic dynamics were not too impressive since the 
Orthodox and Slavic part of the population developed faster.
According to the first imperial census, which was held in 1897, 
Russia was inhabited by 126.5 million people. Orthodox and Old-
Believer Christians amounted to more or less 109.1 million, which 
comprised 86.2% of the population, Roman Catholics – 11.5 million 
(9%), Jews – 5.2 million (4%), Muslims – 13.9 million (10.9%) 
(Демоскоп, № 741–742). Although the numbers draw a picture 
of a multi-cultural empire, the burden of the Southern, Western 
and Eastern frontiers did not seem too heavy for the vigorous and 
well-developing “state-forming nation” – ethnic Russians.
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The territory of the Soviet Union after World War II was almost 
of the same size. Moscow only gave up the east-central Polish 
provinces. After the 1989 census it was possible to make some 
conclusions about the demographic tendencies in the last decade. 
It turned out that the dynamics were generally positive. However, 
some nations grew much more than others if one compares the 
results to those of the previous census, which was held in 1979. 
The main nation was still on its way up: in 10 years it managed 
to reach a 6% growth whereas Poles or Jews recorded a decline 
(98% and 76% respectively). However, there was a tendency that 
had continued for more than two decades: the fast growth of 
the Muslim nations such as the Uzbeks (34%), Chechens (27%), 
Turkmen people (35%), Kazakhs (24%), Azeri people (24%), Tajik 
people (45%), Ingush people (28%) and Avars (24%) (Лабутова, 
1990).
These data might have caused some reflection but in fact they 
were ignored at that time since the main topic of intellectual 
disputes was strictly political and concerned the reforms that 
were supposed to revitalize the USSR as a whole. In 1991 the 
“red empire” collapsed, which correctly seemed to be the main 
issue. Moscow lost direct control over nearly a quarter (23.77%) 
of the territory of the USSR. Theoretically the Russian republic, 
now liberated from the non-Russian rest, should have created the 
best conditions for the development of the Russian nation. The 
coming decades brought about a colossal demographic disaster 
and a visible change of proportions of the particular ethnic groups 
(comp. Вишневский, 2016).
According to official data the Russian ethnic group within 
the territory of the Russian Federation comprised 81.53% of the 
whole population in 1989. It is in fact a weaker result than the 
percentage of Orthodox Christians in the Russian empire at the 
end of the 19th century. In 2010 the index only reached 80.9%. 
The second ethnic group – the Tartars – enjoyed a growth from 
3.76 to 3.87%, whereas the Chechens – a dynamic jump from 0.61 
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to 1.04, the Ingush people from 0.15 to 0.32 and the Azeri group 
from 0.23 to 0.44 (in the case of the last two groups the index 
doubled) (Федеральная служба государственной статистики, 
2012, p. 72). According to the data from 2010 the decrease in the 
ethnic Russian element (if compared to 2002) constituted 4.2 per 
cent, whereas in the case of the whole population it amounted 
to only 1.59%. At the same time the increase in the number of 
Chechens reached 5.23%, of Uzbeks – 135% (166 946 people) 
and of Kyrgyz people – 225.14%. The inflow of groups which 
did not determine their nationality was estimated at 285.38% 
(4 168 678 people) (Statdata, 2017). More recent data are going to 
be available after the next census.
The official data, although convincing enough, may not reflect 
the reality. In informal conversations Russian officials express their 
doubts about the methodology of the last census and are afraid that 
in reality the demographic situation of the Russian nation might 
be much gloomier. According to many commentators (whose 
opinions by no means come from the opposition) the real number 
of Russians is probably significantly lower, especially if one takes 
into account the extinction of the provincial areas (вымирание 
глубинки). In 2017 the analysts of “Realnoye Vremya”, apposing 
the demographic indices of the first halves of 2016 and 2017, 
discovered that the demographic dynamics in the whole territory 
of the Russian Federation once again began a catastrophic 
downfall, especially in Moscow (34.4%). The situation is also not 
good in Tatarstan. However, there are no indicators whether this 
concerns the Russian part of the population or rather the Tartars 
(Реальное Время, 2017).
Although before 2017 the demographic data became slightly 
more optimistic the nationalistic circles still complained that Russia 
managed to overcome the most dramatic decline only because the 
native Russian population had been for years gradually replaced by 
Muslim incomers from Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus 
(comp. Царский Путь. Русский Оперативный Журнал, 2017). 
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The problem is that the real range of this phenomenon is relatively 
difficult to estimate. According to Marlene Laruelle (2016) the 
number of Muslims in Russia is about 15 million with one in ten 
located in Moscow. As she says, “Given forthcoming demographic 
changes, by around 2050 Muslims will represent between one 
third (according to the most conservative estimates) and one 
half (according to the most alarmist assessments) of the Russian 
population”. Laruelle correctly points out the main trends of 
Moscow’s policy toward the growing number of Russian Muslims. 
Firstly, it emphasizes Russia’s openness and friendliness as 
a peaceful country, based on respect towards traditional religions. 
Secondly, it rejects radical Islam labeling all non-conformist 
groups as linked to Wahhabism. Thirdly, it also tries to present 
itself as a part of the Islamic world, a traditionalistic global power 
opposed to the “rotten West” (Laruelle, 2016).
This puts the Russian nationalistic circles in an awkward 
position. Trying to defend “traditional values” they unwillingly 
place themselves on the side of the Kremlin, which in fact introduces 
a kind of “creeping revolution”, deconstructing the exploited term of 
“traditional values”. There is no doubt that Christianity (including 
Orthodoxy) does not promote homosexuality and patchwork 
communities, trying to help traditional families instead. However, 
the most basic values of Christianity such as charity toward all 
people or devotion to the truth about the union of God and man in 
the person of Jesus Christ are incongruent with the Muslim ones. 
A Christian traditionalist cannot agree with a Muslim traditionalist 
in the dispute on the number of wives a man may have. The 
“traditionalists of all countries unite” imperative is a caricature of 
the Marxist slogan rather than a Christian objective.
The reflection on the two main types of reasons for a possible 
national revolution in Russia can only lead to a conclusion that 
the evolving ethnic situation in the contemporary state seems to 
be a much more important motivator than the traditional models 
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of Russian nationalism, which appeared before the political 
disaster of 1917. In other words, today’s Russian nationalists are 
not Slavophiles, pochvenniks or Pan-Slavists; they are people who 
face the challenge of a dying “state nation”, even if their obsession 
is based on a kind of individual fear rather than an analysis of 
statistical data.
* * *
Keeping in mind the historical and social grounds for a national 
revolution in Russia we still do not solve the main problem which 
is the question about the hypothetical possibility of such a change. 
To open a perspective for some attempts it is necessary to point to 
such issues as:
– a modern theoretical base that could be convincing for 
contemporary Russians, 
– the organizational potential,
– the political conditions, 
– the readiness of the Russian people to understand the 
ethnic question and appreciate the attempts of the potential 
revolutionary nationalists, the feeling that something has to 
be changed.
The theoretical base
Russian nationalism of the recent decades is represented 
not only by emotional pamphlets; there is also an abundance of 
important and valuable patterns and theoretical models, which 
have to be taken into deep consideration. However, not all 
proposals are widely known and kept in memory, which makes 
some relatively unproductive. The Russian political and social 
base of narratives after the Stalin era provides an interesting 
range of topics. They can be classified in various ways, according 
to chronological or typological criteria. However, it is obvious 
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that non-communist thought began with the “dissidents”, non-
conformists of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. Some of them, 
such as Marxist revisionists (representatives of “economism”) 
appeared as a result of intellectual resistance which remained 
within the Soviet “internationalist” paradigm. 
Generally speaking, Russian dissidents of the 1960s and 
1970s represented various options. Originally the differences 
were interpreted in a simplified way: the dissidents were divided 
into “the lefts” – those who accepted Marxism (or socialism in 
general) but rejected Stalinism and the rights – those who rejected 
Marxism completely and were “genuine Russian patriots”. They 
were associated with a critical attitude both to Soviet policies and 
to the Russian authoritarian past. In fact, “the lefts” such as Andrei 
Sakharov, Andrei Siniavsky, Grigory Pomerants or Alexandr 
Yanov did not necessarily stick to Marxism. They simply tried to 
act in specific conditions. On the other hand, it is definitely true 
that many of them, such as Yanov, Pomerants or Siniavsky were of 
Jewish descent, which could make their ideas less popular among 
ethnic Russians.
The other group was associated with “Slavophilism” since it 
emphasized the values of the Orthodox tradition as well as the 
legacy of Old Russia and Russian culture. This group, which 
ought to be much more in focus in the present study, is associated 
with such figures as Alexandr Isaevivh Solzhenitsyn, the famous 
writer and Noble Prize winner, Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, 
a distinguished mathematician, or Vadim Mikhailovich Borisov, 
whose name is nearly forgotten nowadays. However, it was 
Borisov who drafted the postulate of Russia’s obligation to find its 
own national face in his text placed in the famous collection From 
Under the Rubble (Из-под глыб, 1974, p. 200). 
The greatest popularity was originally enjoyed by Solzhenitsyn 
who created an important pattern of modern and sublime 
nationalism whose essence boils down to a couple of points:
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1. Communism is not a Russian invention. Its idea was imported 
from the West and implemented by an uprooted elite; it is 
followed by the new intelligentsia, which in fact lost its contact 
with the nation (Из-под глыб, 1974, pp. 217–260).
2. Russia should not seek inspiration in the West since the latter 
passively accepts communism and because of its consumerism 
is unable to struggle for higher values (Солженицын, 1978).
3. Russia should limit its expansionary ambitions and get rid of 
the Soviet ideology, especially the idea of materialistic progress 
(Солженицын, 1990).
4. The Russian nation should develop according to the spiritual 
model of Russian peasantry (Солженицын, 1998).
Solzhenitsyn’s ideas, which became popular in the 1980s and 
1990s, were quite congruent with the ones proposed by Igor 
Shafarevich, whose model contained similar postulates:
1. Socialism is an ancient and destructive tendency in the 
development of humanity. The doctrine was imposed on 
the Russian people because of a non-native harmful germ 
(Шафаревич, 1977). 
2. Although socialist destruction appeared within the circles of 
Russian intelligentsia it would have never succeeded if it had 
not been for the presence of the Jewish element (Шафаревич, 
2005, pp. 432–441).
3. The Western intellectual world as well as alienated intellectuals 
of foreign descent in Russia are permeated with russophobia, 
which rejects the Russian tradition and ambitions as well as the 
country’s rural heritage (Шафаревич, 1988).
Shafarevich’s concept of the Jews and alienated intellectuals as 
a destructive minority within the big nation (an idea borrowed 
from Augustin Cochin) still seems to be rather a reflection of 
Russian nationalism before World War I even though it was 
exploited within the circles of contemporary nationalists. What 
became especially productive is the notion of russophobia, a term 
90 Joachim Diec
that became popular not only among the right camp activists but 
also in the narratives applied by Russian officials and governmental 
spin doctors.
Trying to determine the probability of a national revolution in 
Russia, one has to consider the model of nationalism which resorts 
to the Orthodox tradition such as the Union of Orthodox Banner- 
-Bearers. However, it must be remembered that its adherents face 
an unsolvable problem. Since they treat Orthodoxy as the only true 
faith (единая православная вера) they are obliged to admit its 
universality. In other words, they cannot “privatize” or “nationalize” 
their religion, which is a common temptation in many cultural 
circles: to be a “real” Russian tone ought to be an Orthodox, in the 
same way a “real” Japanese citizen should be a Shintoist, a “real” 
Jew – a Judaist, a “real” Englishman – an Anglican, a “real” Pole 
– a Catholic. This issue becomes problematic while discussing 
the Ukrainian question since the Ukrainians are predominantly 
Orthodox but have a strong conviction of being a separate nation.
A relatively odd model of nationalism was presented by the 
National Bolshevist movement, which took the shape of The 
National-Bolshevik Front, the National-Bolshevik Party, and 
(since 2010) of The Other Russia (Другая Россия), a party 
that was denied registration. Their spiritus movens was the 
scandalous writer Eduard Limonov. The ideology of “nazbols” was 
a combination of totalitarian communism and fascist nationalism. 
This trend of Russian nationalist thought was probably a reaction 
to the liberalization and democratization of Russia that took place 
in the 1990s. Limonov strongly resisted any kind of liberalism, 
democracy and capitalism promoting the idea of a strong state 
led by an authoritarian leader who would defend the interests 
of the people. In the area of foreign policy the nazbols intended 
to re-integrate the post-Soviet area and severely suppress the 
minorities. They identified the main enemy with the US (The 
National-Bolshevik Party website, 2007).
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Another semi-nationalist product of post-Stalinist Russia was 
neo-Eurasianism, a trend that originated in the interwar time (and 
was at that point represented by such thinkers as duke Nikolai 
Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitsky, Petr Suvchinsky, Georgi Florovsky, Lev 
Karsavin, Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky and Nikolai Alekseev). In 
the Soviet era it was continued by a highly popular ethnologist – 
Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov, the son of famous poets: Anna 
Akhmatova and Nikolai Gumilyov. Gumilyov suggested that the 
Russian ethnos is a product of the modern era, not of Old Rus’ and 
that it cultivates the legacy of Genghis-Khan. Consequently, the 
Russian people represent Eurasian virtues rather than European or 
Slavic ones. The Eurasian nation is the ethnic substrate of Eurasia, 
which is generally identical to the territory of the Soviet Union 
(Гумилев, 2002; Пальцев, 2011). 
After the collapse of the USSR the neo-Eurasian idea was 
popularized by other ideologists with their unquestionable leader 
– Alexandr Gelevich Dugin. At the beginning of his intellectual 
journey he proclaimed a “conservative revolution” (a term 
borrowed from Armin Mohler) after the decades of communism. 
However, in what is probably his most popular book, Dugin 
discusses the grounds of geopolitics and develops a strikingly 
anti-Western theory. He exploits Mackinder’s old scheme of the 
competition between the sea powers and the continental ones. 
According to Dugin, Russia is the medium of tellurocracy (the 
continental power), which stands for conservatism/tradition, 
autocracy and collective responsibility for the economy whereas 
the Atlantic powers (especially the US and the United Kingdom) 
represent talassocracy, the power of the sea, which dissolves 
collective obligations. The Western world proposes progress 
instead of tradition, democracy and capitalism, the free market, 
which is responsible for nothing and nobody (Dugin, 1998).
In Dugin’s works the Russian nation is not an ethnic being but 
a Eurasian bedrock of tradition. If we treat neo-Eurasianism as 
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a kind of nationalism, we have to deal with a specific understanding 
of it. There is no doubt that Dugin delivered an influential model 
of Great Russia, an “immortal homeland”. In this concept the 
Russian people together with the other ethnic groups (which 
form the great nation of the Eurasian niche) are responsible for 
the communitarian and traditionalist ethos. Dugin is devoted to 
Orthodoxy in a specific sense. In his books and interviews the 
Russian faith is presented as a “tradition” rather than a “religion”, 
which is normally conditioned by specific rules and beliefs. This 
way Dugin ignores the differences between Orthodoxy and tribal 
Islam, and rejects Western Christianity as an intellectual doctrine. 
Thus, the neo-Eurasianist concept cannot be categorized only 
in terms of nationalism. This refers both to the interwar, primary 
tradition of the movement and to its later forms. Bäcker (2000) 
describes the development of early Eurasianism as a transition 
from a kind of reaction against acculturation to totalitarianism; 
this well-grounded approach seems to be even better justified 
by today’s forms of the movement. According to some recent 
publications (e.g. Mostafa, 2013) Eurasianism is interpreted 
as a unifying political program where ethnic nationalisms are 
replaced by another kind of peaceful solidarity. 
Another theoretical model was delivered by the “tribalists” (or 
racists even), where the nation bears a strictly ethnic meaning, and 
the underlying principle of nationalism lies in the idea of the purity 
of blood (usually known in its Iberian variations – the Portuguese 
limpeza de sangue or the Spanish limpieza de sangre), in the ties of 
kinship. This radical point of view was proposed in the founding 
texts of The People’s National Party, in the ideology of the Slavic 
Union and in the marginal national-socialist groups. One of the 
most interesting and, at the same time, most consistent visions 
of the Russian nation’s fate was presented by Alexei Shiropayev 
in his 2001 book The Prison of the Nation (Тюрьма народа), 
where Russia is illustrated as a place of great sufferings of the 
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Russian tribe. Shiropaev understands it as an Aryan community 
which originated in the North-Eastern territories of Europe and 
descends from Nordic Varangians and Vendens (Slavs). In the 
course of time the Russian tribe had to face dramatic challenges. 
The foreign influence – Eastern, Greek Christianity, which in fact 
originated in the Jewish den, and invasions from the East (the 
inflow of such peoples as Turkic Pechenegs and Polovtsy, Mongols, 
Tartars, etc.) subordinated the nation to Eastern rulers, who soon 
became princes and emperors. Under Soviet rule the Russian tribe 
was exterminated by Jewish commissars or Asian activists. The 
Soviet Union led most of the Russian people to death, with the 
Great Famine in Ukraine and ruthless tactics during World War 
II (Широпаев, 2001).
Finally, we also have to account for a model which is visibly 
related to contemporary incarnations of European “defensive” 
nationalism. Some Russian nationalists make conclusions which 
are analogous to the ones of the Party for Freedom in Holland, the 
Alternative for Germany, Pegida or the National Front in France. 
The model includes mainly the hostility to immigration caused 
by the fear of a barbarian, predominantly Islamic flood. The most 
incisive narrative of that sort was presented in the program of the 
Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).
 However, there is also a much more sophisticated and 
moderate version of “defensive” or “cultural” nationalism in 
contemporary Russia, a program which is also widely accepted 
among many intellectuals. It is connected mainly with the 
National-Democratic Party and its academic tribune in the form 
of “Voprosy nacionalizma”, an interesting and influential journal 
in which the questions of the possibility to build or re-create the 
Russian nation as well as nationalism in general are discussed on 
a relatively high level. Apart from Krylov, who is the head of the 
journal, Natalya Kholmogorova – the co-founder of the initiative, 
Nedezhda Shalimova – the Secretary of the Russian Social 
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Movement, as well as Sergei Sergeev (Сергеев, 2017a; Сергеев, 
2017b), a respected and moderate historian, should also be taken 
into consideration as the ideological leaders of the trend.
To sum up, we can say that Russia has received a rich and 
diversified set of models that could be followed by a mass 
nationalistic movement. However, one should also realize that 
the exploitation of the theoretical concepts given above sketches 
a dichotomous explanatory model of Russian nationalism. Its 
internal divergence was also formulated by Tat’yana and Valerii 
Solovei, who make a distinction between the supporters of a purely 
national state and the imperialists (Соловей and Соловей, 2011, 
p. 402). Most of Russian nationalists are somewhere in between 
but the contradiction remains clear: imperialism is an efficient 
impediment to the perspective of an ethnically pure country. In 
other words, Russia for Russians would be inevitably smaller than 
a monstrous Great Russia (Великая Россия).
The organizational potential
Russian nationalism is represented by many groups and 
theoreticians. Most of these circles are (or were) relatively small and 
often had no real access to peripheral areas. Giving a full picture 
of nationalist organizations in Russia is hardly possible. Some of 
them are listed by Dubas (2008, pp. 47ff), some are described in 
other studies such as Laruelle et al. (2009). The list given below is 
by no means complete. However, for further studies it is advisable 
to remember such groups, organizations and parties as:
1. “National traditionalist” organizations:
Formerly:
– The Memory (Память, Pamyat), the oldest post-Stalinist 
nationalist organization, which goes back to the beginning 
of the 1970s and ceased to exist in 2003 after the death of its 
leader, Dmitry Vasilyev,
Currently:
– Great Russia (since 2007).
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2. The xenophobic and anti-immigrant ones:
– Rus – Party for the Defence of the Russian Constitution 
(Партия  Защиты  Российской  Конституции  “Русь”, 
ПЗРК),
– Russiаn National Unity (Русское Национальное 
Единство),
– The Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Движение 
Против Нелегальной Иммиграции).
3. Ethnic and racist nationalist groups:
– The Russian Social Movement (Русское Общественное 
Движение),
– The Slavic Union (Славянский Союз),
– The National Union (Народный Союз),
– National Socialist Society (Национал-социалистическое 
общество),
4. The National-Bolshevik organizations:
Formerly:
– National Bolshevik Front (1993),
– National Bolshevik Party (1994–2007).
Currently:
– The Other Russia (since 2010).
5. The Orthodox-nationalistic organizations:
– The Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (Союз право-
славных хоругвеносцев),




– Eurasia Party (Партия “Евразия”),
– the Eurasian Youth Union (Евразийский союз моло дежи).
7. State nationalist (imperialist) parties and organizations:
– Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia,
– “Rodina” Party – The National Front (Партия “РО-
ДИНА”),
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– The Congress of Russian Communities (Конгресс русских 
общин).
The number of the members of the particular groups is 
difficult to estimate. Even the officially registered establishment 
organizations and parties do not publish such statistics. 
However, in 2008 the “Kommersant” magazine, pointing to the 
information available then in the Federal Registration Bureau 
(Федеральная регистрационная служба), provided the number 
of LDPR members which was supposed to be 155.86 thousand 
(“Коммерсант”, 2008). The radical groups are rather small and 
usually do not exceed 100 activists in each of the centers. The 
cores of the organizations, however, are surrounded by a changing 
number of supporters. 
What seems to be a valuable source of information (from the 
organizational perspective) is the demonstration which is annually 
held on November 4 (the Day of National Unity) – the Russian 
March. The organizers declare that 
the Russians are dissatisfied with the fact that they do not have their 
own national state, that their interests are not considered in Russia, 
because of the adoption of “substituting migration”, and because 
their existence and their right to determine their own future are 
now being questioned. 
The organization of the demonstration is in the hands of the 
Center for the Russian Committee of the Russian March, which 
nominally consisted of 9 people in September 2017: 
– Vladimir Basmanov – the founder of the anti-immigrant 
DPNI and of the Russian Association in exile, as well as 
the head of the “Nation and Freedom” Committee, one of 
the main organizers of the first Russian March and many 
subsequent ones,
– Alexandr Belov – his brother, a political prisoner since 2016, 
one of the leaders of the DPNI and the Russian Association, 
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another key organizer of the first Russian March and many 
subsequent ones,
– Maxim Vakhromov – one of the leaders of the National 
Union of Russia (Национальный Союз России), the leader 
of the nationalists in Yekaterinburg where he organizes the 
Russian marches,
– Vitaly Goryunov – one of the leaders of the National Union 
of Russia, the head of the nationalists of Tula and the 
organizer of the Russian Marches in Tula,
– Sergey Guzhev – the organizer of the Russian Marches in 
Vologda,
– Aleksey Kolegov – a political prisoner, one of the leaders 
of the Russian Association and the organization Frontier of 
the North (Рубеж Севера), formerly the main organizer of 
the Russian Marches in Syktyvkar (Komi Republic),
– Georgi Pavlov – the organizer of the Russian Marches in 
Pskov,
– Igor Stenin – one of the leaders of the Russian Association, 
the main organizer of the Russian Marches in Astrakhan,
– Alexei Bakhtin – a political prisoner, formerly the main 
organizer of the Russian Marches in Novosibirsk.
The Central Organizing Committee embraces interregional 
advisory groups which include all the organizers of the Russian 
March who would like to take part in the collegial discussion about 
preparations for the Russian March. There are also a number of 
functional commissions within the Committee, formed by various 
participants who devote their time to organizational issues (see 
Русский марш, 2017).
According to the Agency of Russian Information the number 
of participants of the march in 2006 exceeded 7000 (Агентство 
Русской Информации, 2006). The exact data referring to the 
march in 2016 and 2017 are not available. However, as one of 
the oldest organizers, Alexei Mikhailov, declared in an interview, 
after the march he was taken to the local police department 
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(Управление внутренних дел) and fined because the declared 
number of participants was exceeded: no fewer than 8 thousand 
people turned up (Михайлов, 2016). Such numbers (if one takes 
into account the size of Moscow) do not make a great impression. 
However, we have to remember that Russian national extremists 
are under constant control and a gathering such as the Russian 
March during a national holiday provides evidence for the 
determination of the nationalistic circles.
Political conditions
There is no doubt that the Russian authorities, both in the 
1990s and later, found imperialist and statist nationalism much 
more suitable for the realization of their objectives than the racist 
or anti-immigrant versions (comp. Panov, 2010). People like 
Dmitry Rogozin (who has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Russian Federation since 2011), the leader of Rodina and 
the Congress of Russian Communities, or Alexandr Dugin, 
the founder of the neo-Eurasianist movement (who received 
substantial financial support for his publications and even became 
the chair of the Sociology of International Relations at Moscow 
State University), were by no means treated as unwanted people 
within the Russian political establishment.
Since the imperial nationalists, unlike the liberals, supported 
the hard line toward the West, especially to the US, the Kremlin, 
especially after 2000, treated them as natural allies: they at least 
aimed at the extension of Moscow’s influence to former Soviet 
republics, where a good part of the new states’ population was 
ethnically Russian. The liberals of the 1990s did not see any chance 
of success in such assertive behavior and highlighted the possible 
negative consequences, especially in the sphere of international 
trade.
Putin’s regime did a lot to not only get rid of the liberal 
opposition but also to hamper the budding development of 
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another potential enemy: the radical nationalist non-conformist 
groups. There were several reasons behind this course of action. 
First of all, they were difficult to control and resorted to direct 
public support with no intermediation of the Kremlin. Another 
problem lay and still lies in their exclusive style: appealing to ethnic 
Russian sentiments they exclude a large and still growing milieu 
of nations which were tempted by Putin’s regime to unite under 
the control of Moscow. The Kremlin, as it previously was in the 
case of the Mongol Empire, Victorian Britain or imperial Russia, 
appeared to be unable to give up the idea of expansion. In other 
words, geopolitical imperatives (according to state documents, 
presidential addresses to the National Assembly and political 
practice in nearly all spheres) overshadowed the economic, or, 
more generally, the civilizational ones. Finally, at least some of the 
nationalistic groups such as the DPNI or People’s National Party 
served programs which matched very well the European practice of 
extreme nationalism. This way they seemed to be much more pro-
European than pro-Eurasian: they discovered that the Russians 
are white Christians or white Aryans, and that they constitute 
a part of the European civilization.
The main device used as a weapon in the struggle against the 
nationalist threat is the refusal to register a party under the pretext 
of extremism. Since 2002 a significant number of political parties 
and organizations have been denied registration because of real 
or imaginary extremism on the grounds of the Federal Law on 
Combating Extremist Activity (Федеральный закон от 25 июля 
2002 г. N 114–ФЗ). Chapter 1 of the bill states that extremist activity 
also includes such things as “incitement to social, racial, ethnic 
or religious hatred; propaganda of exclusiveness, superiority or 
inferiority of an individual based on his/her social, racial, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic identity, or his/her attitude to religion”. This 
way Putin’s KGB team obtained a perfect device to eliminate ethnic 
nationalists from the main game of thrones. Since 2002 a great 
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number of nationalistic organizations and parties were refused 
registration; some were banned and persecuted.
The Russian state of mind
Russian nationalistic sentiments are not easy to study because 
the matter is somewhat elusive. However, we can take into 
consideration the results of the public opinion research conducted 
by Levada Center in which the respondents were asked about their 
attitude to the nationalist imperative: “Russia only for Russians”. 
The initial set of studies was done in the years 1998–2009. The 
results were unclear and did not reveal any unquestionable 
tendency. Strong support varied from 14% in 2007 to 19% in 
2005. Relative support (“it would be advisable to realize this 
idea in a reasonable framework”) ranged from 31% in 1998 to 
42% in 2008. Strong objection gained the least popularity (18%) 
in 2000 and was accepted most widely in 1998 (32%) (Левада- 
-Центр, 2009). 
In 2016 we received another portion of information which 
was discussed in the media. Levada Center revealed that the 
popularity of the nationalist slogan did not change significantly. 
Answering the question about the attitude to this imperative, 
14% of respondents declared full support, 38% were more accurate 
and said that such a thesis would be a good idea to implement 
in reasonable limits. 21% of the respondents reacted sharply to 
the idea saying that this was real fascism. The same percentage 
of the respondents answered that they were not interested in the 
topic. Sociologists asked people whether they should restrict the 
residence in the territory of Russia to representatives of certain 
nationalities. 20% of the respondents said that no restrictions 
should be introduced, 34% advocated limiting residence in Russia 
to people from the Caucasus, 29% were against the incomers from 
the former Central Asian republics of the USSR, 24% were negative 
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towards the Chinese, 21% – to the Roma Gypsies, 19% did not 
want to see the Vietnamese in the Russian Federation, 13% – the 
Ukrainians, 6% – Jews (ZNAK, 2016; another study on the topic: 
Dubas, 2008, pp. 29–30).
Discussing the results presented above one has to remember 
that 52 per cent of the entire or relative support seems good for 
the nationalists for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is more than 
likely that in the territories which are traditionally settled by 
other nationalities, such as Chechnya, Buryatia or Tuva, Russian 
nationalistic slogans cannot be widely accepted. In other words, in 
the Russian ethnic territories such imperatives gain even stronger 
support. Secondly, the decreasing percentage of ethnic Russians 
in Russia leads to the tide of xenophobia. On the other hand, 
a strong feeling of an emerging demographic disaster in the sense 
of the ethnic composition of the population may lead to other acts 
of social unrest.
The readiness for radical action was proven in a series of 
violent events, especially the ones in Kondopoga, Karelia in 2006 
and on Manezh square in Moscow in 2010. In Kondopoga, after 
a Chechen group killed two local Russians, crowds of people tried 
to take revenge and in fact forced many Chechens to leave the 
town. In Moscow the violent reaction was a result of the death of 
a Spartak soccer fan who was killed by five Dagestanis. During 
the riots 32 people were injured and, what makes the case more 
interesting, three members of the Other Russia: Igor Berezyuk, 
Ruslan Khubaev and Kirill Unchuk, were arrested, tried and 
sentenced to imprisonment (8, 4.5, and 3 years respectively) 
(Правозащитный центр “Мемориал”, 2014). The probability of 
such phenomena to occur in the future cannot be easily estimated. 
However, this potential cannot be entirely neglected because the 
trials after the Manezh events did not stop the tension (e.g. in 
October 2013 in Biryulovo, a district of Moscow, a huge crowd 
of local people attacked the properties of immigrants after the 
murder of a young Russian, Yegor Shcherbakov). 
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Concluding remarks
A critical review of the four constituting aspects leads to 
ambiguous conclusions about the perspectives of a national 
revolution in Russia. 
First of all, it must be said that the first pillar of a possible 
revolution, the theoretical grounds, are relatively well-developed 
and logically structured. Russian nationalists have a lot of historical 
and new models of a nationalist political change at their disposal. 
The older models, however, seem less effective in the context of the 
situation in which the Russian nation is nowadays. The religious 
and ideological conflict with the West or another external enemy 
is far behind the other challenges such as the growing presence 
of Caucasian and Central Asian incomers, who may become 
the successors of ethnic Russians in the great state if the present 
demographic tendencies are to continue.
The analysis supports the opinion that the contemporary 
nationalism is conceptually divergent. One of its poles consists 
in Russian imperialism, political inclusivism and expansionism 
(deeply rooted in the previous periods of Russian history), and is 
generally supported by the Kremlin. The other trend – the ethnic 
and “exclusive” nationalism, is contested by the present elite, which 
perceives it as a threat to the state’s integrity.
The organizational potential of Russian nationalists cannot 
be neglected but is generally a disputable issue. The imperialist 
nationalists are represented in solid structures such as the 
Congress of Russian Communities or the Liberal-Democratic 
Party of Russia. However, they are strongly subordinated to the 
Kremlin camp and would not gain sufficient support without the 
help of the government. On the other hand, the ethnically and 
culturally-oriented nationalists are dispersed in customarily small 
and suppressed organizations with no coordinative center.
The political and legal conditions for a nationalist revolution 
are not favorable. The non-conformists have to take into account 
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significant problems with registration, official bans and difficulties 
with gaining access to the media. According to the 2002 Federal Law 
On Combating Extremist Activity several radical groups or relatively 
moderate organizations were erased from the official political life 
in Russia and no liberalization in this area can be expected.
The question about the readiness of the Russian people to 
support a nationalist political change in the future remains open. 
However, series of events such as the ones in Kondopoga in 2006 
or in the very center of Moscow in 2010 provide evidence that 
awareness of the problem is hidden somewhere in the Russian souls 
and that the sleeping bear can wake up if the situation gets out of 
control. On the one hand, the feeling that the inner immigrants are 
getting a competitive advantage seems to be growing because of 
the objective demographic processes. On the other – the growing 
share of non-Russian inhabitants of the Federation may weaken 
the revolutionary potential.
* * *
In the 2010s, after the marginalization of oligarchs and liberal 
parties such as the Union of Right Forces (Cоюз правых сил) or the 
Yabloko Party (Партия “Яблоко”), Alexei Navalny, the founder of 
Anti-Corruption Foundation and the leader of the Progress Party, 
became the most recognizable symbol of Russian opposition. His 
political image was associated with his actions against corruption 
on the one hand and with the emphasis put on the interests of the 
Russian nation, especially in the context of the Caucasian threat, 
on the other. His views are perceived as “national democratic”. 
That is why Navalny ought to be described as a representative 
of “vitalistic” nationalism; he generally promotes a vision of an 
uncorrupted state to build a healthy market economy, which 
brings him closer to the liberals. However, he was also strikingly 
critical about the Caucasian elites: both the ones connected with 
the Kremlin and the Islamic traditionalists or fundamentalists. 
Laruelle (2014) correctly points to the fact that in the activities of 
Navalny nationalism and liberalism are in a way reconciled.
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There is a widespread opinion that Navalny is not a really 
strong personality but rather an artificial creation: his blog and 
other texts on the internet were supposed to have been produced 
by a team with the leader being only a supposititious figure. This 
might be, however, a secondary problem. What is much more 
important is the fact that Navalny’s popularity (which became clear 
during the election to Moscow’s City Hall), no matter what kind 
of personality the politician really presented, revealed a genuine 
need for a seemingly odd combination: Russia’s rapprochement to 
the Euro-Atlantic civilizational standards in order to build a state 
which the Russian nation could ultimately treat as its own. The 
“restless” perception of the difficult political reality in Russia, in 
which Navalny is only a personification of contestation seems 
to be more and more congruent with Andrei Savelyev’s opinion 
that for those who think about the salvation of the Russian nation 
the evolutionary option is theoretically possible but in fact not 
accessible because of the lack of time (Savelyev, 2005).
Rewolucja, której nie było:  
potencjał odrodzenia rosyjskiego nacjonalizmu
W rozdziale omówiono perspektywy rewolucji nacjonalistycznej w Rosji. Bada-
niu poddano teoretyczną bazę, obiektywne okoliczności, mogące się przyczynić 
do ewentualnej zmiany, potencjał organizacyjny organizacji nacjonalistycznych, 
warunki polityczne i nastroje rosyjskiej części obywateli Federacji Rosyjskiej. 
Pierwszy filar ewentualnej rewolucji, to jej fundamenty teoretyczne, stosun-
kowo dobrze rozwinięte i logicznie zorganizowane. Rosyjscy nacjonaliści mają 
do dyspozycji wiele historycznych i współczesnych modeli nacjonalistycz-
nych przemian politycznych. Jednak starsze modele wydają się mniej skutecz-
ne w kontekście obecnej sytuacji narodu rosyjskiego. Religijne i ideologiczne 
konflikty z Zachodem czy innym wrogiem zewnętrznym, schodzą na dalszy 
plan wobec takich problemów jak rosnąca obecność kaukaskich i środkowo-
azjatyckich emigrantów, którzy mogą stać się następcami etnicznych Rosjan 
w państwie. 
Analiza potwierdza pogląd, że współczesny nacjonalizm jest konceptual-
nie rozbieżny. Jednym z jego biegunów jest rosyjski imperializm, inkluzywność 
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i ekspansja polityczna (głęboko zakorzenione w poprzednim okresie historii 
Rosji), generalnie wspierane przez Kreml. Druga tendencja – etniczny i „uni-
kalny” nacjonalizm, poddawany krytyce przez obecną elitę, która postrzega go 
jako zagrożenie dla integralności państwa. 
Nie należy nie doceniać organizacyjnego potencjału rosyjskich nacjona-
listów, charakterystyczne są tu jednak rozproszenie i brak woli zjednoczenia. 
Imperialistyczni nacjonaliści reprezentowani są w tak potężnych strukturach 
jak Kongres Wspólnot Rosyjskich czy Polityczna Partia LDPR (wcześniej Libe-
ralno-Demokratyczna Partia Rosji). Są silnie podporządkowani Kremlowi i nie 
mogą odnieść sukcesu bez pomocy rządu. Natomiast etnicznie i kulturowo zo-
rientowanej nacjonaliści są rozproszeni w różnych organizacjach, pozbawieni 
koordynującego centrum i są prześladowani. 
Polityczne i prawne warunki dla przeprowadzenia nacjonalistycznej rewo-
lucji nie są korzystne. Należy wziąać pod uwagę duże problemy z rejestracją, 
oficjalnymi zakazami, trudnościami z dostępem do mediów. Na mocy federal-
nej ustawy z dnia 25 lipca 2002 r. N 114-ФЗ „O przeciwdziałaniu działalności 
ekstremistycznej” kilka radykalnych grup bądź relatywnie umiarkowancych 
organizacji zostało usuniętych z oficjalnego życia politycznego w Rosji i nie 
przewiduje się liberalizacji w tej dziedzinie.
Kwestia gotowości Rosjan do wspierania nacjonalistycznych zmian poli-
tycznych w przyszłości pozostaje otwarta. Niemniej jednak wiele wydarzeń, 
takich jak zamieszki w Kondopodze w 2006 r. czy na placu Manieżnym w grud-
niu 2010 r., pokazuje, że świadomość problemu kryje się gdzieś w rosyjskich 
duszach i, że śpiący niedźwiedź może się obudzić, jeśli sytuacja wymknie się 
spod kontroli. Z jednej strony, poczucie, że wewnętrzni imigranci są bardziej 
konkurencyjni, wydaje się wzrastać z powodu obiektywnych procesów demo-
graficznych. Z drugiej – udział nierosyjskich mieszkańców Federacji może 
osłabić potencjał rewolucyjny.
Революция, которая не произошла:  
потенциал возрождения русского национализма
Глава рассматривает перспективы национальной революции в России. 
Предметом изучения является: теоретическая база, объективные обсто-
ятельства, способствующие возможной перемене, организационный по-
тенциал националистских организаций, политические условия и настро-
ения русской части населения Российской Федерации. 
Первое условие возможной революции, теоретические ее основания, 
относительно хорошо развиты и логически структурированы. У русских 
националистов в распоряжении есть много «исторических» и новых мо-
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делей националистических политических перемен. Однако, более старые 
модели кажутся менее эффективными в контексте актуальной ситуации 
российской нации. Религиозно-идеологический конфликт с Западом или 
другим внешним врагом отходит на второй план перед такой проблемой 
как растущее присутствие кавказских и среднеазиатских инородцев, кото-
рые могут стать преемниками этнических русских в большом государстве.
Анализ подтверждает мнение о том, что современный национализм 
концептуально расходится. Одним из его полюсов является российский 
империализм, политическая инклюзивность и экспансионизм (глубоко 
укорененный в предыдущих периодах русской истории) и в целом под-
держивается Кремлем. Другая тенденция – этнический и «исключитель-
ный» национализм оспаривается нынешней элитой, которая восприни-
мает его как угрозу целостности государства.
Организационным потенциалом русских националистов нельзя 
пренебрегать, однако, он подвергается дисперсии и характеризуется от-
сутствием воли объединения. Империалистические националисты пред-
ставлены в таких мощных структурах, как Конгресс русских общин или 
Либерально-демократическая партия России. Они сильно подчинены 
кремлевскому лагерю и не в состоянии добиться успеха без помощи пра-
вительства. С другой стороны, этнически и культурно ориентированные 
националисты разбросаны в разных организациях, лишены единого ко-
ординационного центра, и подвергаются гонениям.
Политические и правовые условия для националистической револю-
ции не благоприятны. Нонконформисты должны считаться со значитель-
ными проблемами: с регистрацией, официальными запретами, трудностя-
ми с доступом к средствам массовой информации. Согласно Федеральному 
Закону от 25 июля 2002 г. N 114-ФЗ «О противодействии экстремистской 
деятельности» несколько радикальных групп или относительно умерен-
ных организаций были устранены из официальной политической жизни 
в России и никакой либерализации в этой области не ожидается.
Вопрос о готовности русского народа поддержать националисти-
ческие политические изменения в будущем остается открытым. Тем не 
менее, ряд событий, таких как беспорядки в Кондопоге в 2006 году или 
на Манежной в декабре 2010 г., свидетельствует о том, что осознание 
проблемы скрывается где-то в российских душах и что спящий медведь 
может проснуться, если ситуация выйдет из-под контроля. С одной сто-
роны, ощущение, что внутренние иммигранты получают конкурентное 
преимущество, похоже, растет из-за объективных демографических про-
цессов. С другой – растущая доля нерусских жителей Федерации может 
ослабить революционный потенциал.
